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Introduction
If recent weather events are any indication as to what the United States will face in the future,
the country has entered a new era of catastrophes. Owing to increased population and more
exposed assets in hazard-prone areas, we can expect more devastating and costly natural
disasters in the coming years. Changes in climate patterns are likely to exacerbate this trend
due to sea level rise and increased ﬂooding from more frequent precipitation events and
possibly more intense hurricanes and related storm surges.
Hurricane Sandy, which made landfall in the highly populated New York/New Jersey
region in October 2012, is the latest reminder of America’s vulnerability to natural disasters,
causing an estimated US$72 billion in damage. Compared with victims of Hurricane Katrina
in 2005, those at risk from Sandy were better prepared for the disaster, with evacuation plans
and more investment in risk-reduction measures in place. Still, a 2013 report by the Mayor’s
ofﬁce of New York City estimates that less than 20 per cent of residential buildings in areas
inundated by Sandy had ﬂood insurance.1 Those who were insured received insurance claim
payments from the federally run National Flood Insurance program (NFIP).
1 City of New York (2013).
The NFIP, administered by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
provides ﬂood insurance to 5.6 million policyholders across the country and covers more
than US$1.2 trillion in assets, a 250 per cent increase since 1990, corrected for inﬂation.2 In
the aftermath of the 2005 and 2008 hurricane seasons, the programme had to borrow US$18
billion from the U.S. Treasury to pay an historical level of claims, leading to calls for
reforming this programme by the U.S. Congress, FEMA and ﬂood hazard and insurance
experts alike. Between 2010 and 2012, FEMA conducted a policy review of possible reform
options.3 One of FEMA’s reforms options, which is the focus of this paper, is the
privatisation of residential ﬂood insurance.4 The logic behind this would be to offset some
of the taxpayers’ de facto exposure to ﬂood risk: when Sandy hit in 2012, the NFIP had to
borrow another US$9.7 billion from the U.S. Treasury to pay its claims—totalling US$27
billion in debt today.
Given that residential ﬂood insurance is provided by the private market in several other
countries including Australia, France, Germany, Japan and the U.K.,5 this is ostensibly not
an unreasonable reform option for the United States. This possible increased role of the
private insurance sector to cover ﬂood risk was also part of the U.S. National Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2012.
A key research question related to the privatisation reform option is to determine the
amount that private insurers would charge if they were to underwrite residential ﬂood
insurance on a large scale in the United States. To our knowledge, this research has not been
undertaken. It is an important question to address as conventional wisdom holds that the
private market would systematically charge more than the NFIP. There are also issues
associated with affordability of coverage that need to be addressed in order for insurers to
consider entering this market.
Central to this question is whether private insurers are able to measure homeowners’
individual ﬂood risk more effectively than FEMA currently does and thus charge a premium
that would more accurately reﬂect individual exposures. FEMA has the responsibility for
mapping communities participating in the NFIP and designates high to minimal ﬂood zone
risks within these mapped communities. Whether private insurers are able to measure and
price ﬂood risk better than FEMA is worth analysing, since as of 2008, 50 per cent of
FEMA’s 100,000 ﬂood risk maps were outdated, primarily due to limited resources at their
disposal.6
This paper focuses on how premiums are determined that are considered to be actuarially
fair rather than examining the well-known subsidies that have been part of the programme
since its inception in 1968. The NFIP prices their entire portfolio by calculating the average
2 Michel-Kerjan (2010).
3 The four options FEMA discusses in its 2011 report are: keeping the programme as is (status quo), modernising
the programme in its current form, privatising ﬂood insurance, and transferring the responsibility of ﬂood
insurance from the federal government to the communities. See FEMA (2011) for more details. The Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (also known as Biggert–Waters 2012, or BW12), modiﬁed in 2014, phased in
risk-based premiums over time for policies currently subsidised by the programme.
4 The NFIP covers both residential and small business lines but we focus here on residential insurance only,
speciﬁcally single-family residential. NFIP commercial coverage in Texas represents less than 5 per cent of the
total NFIP policies in force.
5 Clark (1998); von Ungern-Sternberg (2004); Thieken et al. (2006); Botzen and van den Bergh (2008).
6 GAO (2008).
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historical losses and at a rather aggregate geographical level. It also lacks elevation data for a
number of structures it insures. We contend that a much more granular approach based on
probabilistic risk assessment incorporating data from past events coupled with future ﬂood
scenarios at a given location is required to determine the pure premium for a given structure.
The technology for undertaking these computations currently exists. We compare the results
of this more comprehensive analysis with premiums currently charged by the NFIP.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section brieﬂy discusses the operation of
the NFIP, how it prices ﬂood insurance and the challenges the programme currently faces.
In the subsequent section we characterise a methodology based on advanced probabilistic
catastrophe modelling by the private sector that determines at an individual property level
the risk-based premium for providing a homeowner with ﬂood risk coverage. We then
apply this methodology to over 300,000 residences in two Texas counties: Travis (inland;
riverine ﬂood risk) and Galveston (coastal; primarily storm surge ﬂood risk) as a pilot
study. Our research team partnered with the large data provider CoreLogic and the
reinsurance company Swiss Re to access hazard, exposure and vulnerability data for these
individual residences in these two counties.
We selected Texas for the analysis because it is a state with one of the largest number of
NFIP ﬂood insurance policies in force in the U.S. and has suffered from severe ﬂood events
in recent years. For example, in 2008 Hurricane Ike made landfall in Texas as a category
2 hurricane and triggered the third largest NFIP payment in the history of the programme
(after Hurricanes Katrina in 2005—US$16 billion—and Sandy in 2010—US$8 billion) with
US$2.6 billion in ﬂood insurance claims. Moreover, we were able to look both at surge risk
on the coast and inland riverine ﬂooding within Texas.
The penultimate section compares unloaded premiums (i.e. pure premiums generated by
the probabilistic catastrophe ﬂood model) and full premiums (that incorporate different
loading factors) with those charged by the NFIP for single-family residences in Travis and
Galveston Counties in Texas. Given that the NFIP is federally run and does not seek to make
a proﬁt, some might expect the programme to charge lower premiums, all things being equal.
But a key ﬁnding of this analysis is that there are a variety of cases where it would be, on
average, less expensive for residents to purchase ﬂood insurance from private insurers than
from the NFIP and not only in the designated low-risk ﬂood zones.
We ﬁnd for instance, that 90 per cent of residents in FEMA’s V zones in Galveston (high
risk on the coast; see deﬁnition of zones in the appendix) are currently charged by the NFIP a
pure premium that is higher on average than what the probabilistic risk assessment indicates
should be the case. We also ﬁnd that many other residents are currently potentially
undercharged by the NFIP on average, not necessarily because of a subsidy they receive,
but as a result of inaccurate ﬂood hazard maps and the way FEMA prices insurance through
classes of risk at a very large level of aggregation. Notably, on the coast where storm surge
ﬂooding seems poorly integrated into FEMA’s ﬂood hazard maps, many residences across
all ﬂood zones are not paying the risk-based price. As we explain in more detail later in the
paper, these results are likely a consequence of (a) outdated and non-comprehensive ﬂood
maps and (b) the averaging of ﬂood insurance rates across large areas in a given ﬂood zone
based only on average loss. They do not take well into account local geographic ﬂood risk
differences and the potential for truly catastrophic events. The ﬁnal section concludes with a
discussion of the market and policy implications of these results, including the impact of
risk-based premiums on the demand for ﬂood insurance.
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NFIP pricing of ﬂood insurance coverage
This section provides an overview of the history of the NFIP, its current scope, and some of
the challenges it faces today. We also describe how the NFIP prices ﬂood insurance.
Origin and operation of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
The NFIP was developed in 1968 because, ever since the severe Mississippi ﬂoods of 1927,
the private insurance industry believed ﬂood risk was uninsurable due to adverse selection
and the possibility of massive losses.7 Additionally, there were concerns about their ability to
correctly price the product, because the level of sophistication in hazard assessment was
quite limited back in the 1960s compared with what it is today.8
This lack of coverage by the private sector led the federal government to provide signiﬁcant
relief to victims of Hurricane Betsy in 1965 and led to a discussion as to whether the federal
government could develop a federal ﬂood insurance programme.9 A government programme
could potentially be successful because it would have funds to initiate the programme, pool
risks more broadly, subsidise existing homeowners to maintain their property values while
charging actuarial rates to new construction, and tie insurance to land-use changes that might
lower risks. The programme would also have the capacity to spread losses over time by
borrowing money from the federal government to compensate for a deﬁcit, something private
insurers cannot do.10 Thus, the main goal of the NFIP was to provide ﬂood insurance to those
in hazard-prone areas with the understanding that there might still be truly exceptional events
for which the programme would have to borrow money from the federal government.
Flood insurance premiums are determined by FEMA, which manages the programme. Over
95 per cent of NFIP policies are written through the Write Your Own (WYO) Program, which
allows participating property/casualty insurance companies in the private market to write and
service NFIP’s standard one-year ﬂood insurance policy.11 The insurance companies bear no risk
and are compensated for writing policies and settling claims. The NFIP provides insurance up to
a maximum limit for residential property damage, now set at US$250,000 for building coverage
and US$100,000 on contents coverage. Some additional coverage is offered by private insurers
above these limits for residential property owners, although this represents a small percentage
(less than 5 per cent approximately) of total residential coverage. There is also private ﬂood insu-
rance coverage in the lender-placed market, 160,000 policies on average at any point in time.12
The scope of the NFIP has increased signiﬁcantly over the past decades, mainly due to a
combination of more people living in hazard areas,2,13 more of them buying insurance and
7 Overman (1957); Gerdes (1963).
8 Considerable progress has been made in catastrophe modelling, GIS and risk map digitalisation in the past 20
years and has improved the risk assessment process considerably as discussed in the section ‘Determination of
ﬂood insurance pure premiums using catastrophe modelling’.
9 Kunreuther et al. (1978); Burby (2001).
10 See Michel-Kerjan (2010) for an analysis of the operation of the programme between 1968 and 2009.
11 Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010).
12 Dixon et al. (2007).
13 For instance, according to the U.S. Census data, the population in Texas increased from 9.5 million in 1960 to
nearly 26 million in 2011 and the population of Florida from 2.5 million in 1950 to 19 million in 2011, a large
portion of those people being exposed to ﬂood hazard.
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their purchasing more insurance.14 The total value of property insured under the NFIP was
US$165 billion in 1978, US$348 billion in 1990, and US$703 billion in 2000. Between 2001
and 2010, the total exposure increased by another 75 per cent, reaching US$1.23 trillion at
the end of December 2009 (corrected for inﬂation; 2009 prices). This level has remained
stable since. On 1 January 2014, there were 5.47 million NFIP policies in force nationwide
which generated US$3.53 billion in premiums (average annual premium per policy of
US$645 nationwide) for a total of US$1.28 trillion under coverage. Highly populated coastal
states have the largest number of ﬂood insurance policies in the NFIP, as would be expected.
In particular, two states—Florida and Texas—represent more than 50 per cent of the entire
NFIP policies in force; approximately 70 per cent of all policies are in ﬁve states—Florida,
Texas, Louisiana, California, and New Jersey.15
Limits of the current NFIP ﬂood insurance premium pricing approach16
The NFIP’s goals with regard to setting prices differ from those of a private insurance company
for several reasons. The NFIP does not have to make a proﬁt nor must its premiums reﬂect the
cost of capital insurers would have to pay. It also does not have to be concerned with the risk of
insolvency due to truly extreme events since it can borrow ex post from the U.S. Treasury to meet
its claims.17 Furthermore, approximately 25 per cent of all policies are subsidised, while the
remaining properties are charged the average historical loss-based rates as determined by FEMA.
To set premiums and support local governments, the NFIP maps participating communities,
designating ﬂood risks through different ﬂood zones. These maps are called Flood Insurance
Rate Maps (FIRMs). A building that was in place pre-FIRM—before the mapping of ﬂood risk
was completed in that area—is often given subsidised rates. Homes built after the risk mapping
are charged premiums reﬂecting FEMA’s ﬂood maps. The programme was structured to
subsidise the cost of ﬂood insurance on existing homes, in order to maintain property values,
while charging actuarially fair rates on new construction. There was an expectation that fewer
policies would be subsidised over time. However, around a quarter of properties are still
subsidised today since the housing stock is turning over more slowly than predicted, partly
because of new renovation techniques that have extended the life of buildings.18,19
The goal of the programme-wide pricing strategy is to collect enough premiums to cover
the operating expenses and losses associated with the historic average loss year without
accounting for the possibility of a truly catastrophic event.20 Premiums set by FEMA are
determined ﬁrst using the NFIP’s Actuarial Rate Formula described in their annual rate
reviews. This pricing is focused on the high-risk A and V ﬂood zones. The high-risk A zones
14 Inﬂation-corrected data shows that the average quantity of insurance per policy almost doubled over 30 years,
from US$114,000 in 1978 to US$217,000 in 2009 (Michel-Kerjan, 2010).
15 All states have at least some NFIP policies in force. The states with the lowest number of policies in force— all
less than 5,000 policies are: Alaska, the District of Columbia, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah,
Vermont and Wyoming.
16 We thank the NFIP team of actuaries at FEMA for their feedback on an earlier version of this section.
17 Hayes et al. (2007).
18 Pasterick (1998); Wetmore et al. (2006); CBO (2007); Kousky (2011).
19 See Bin and Polasky (2004) and Bin et al. (2008) for an analysis of how ﬂood hazard negatively impacts
housing market price.
20 Hayes and Spafford (2008).
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are deﬁned as areas with a 1 per cent or greater annual chance of ﬂooding; V zones are
deﬁned as coastal areas with a 1 per cent or greater annual chance of ﬂooding and an
additional hazard associated with storm waves. A deﬁnition of FEMA ﬂood zones is
provided in Appendix A.
The problem is that ﬂood magnitude is not limited to what would be deemed a 100-year
ﬂood depth amount. The return period of the storm tracks for Hurricane Sandy has been
estimated at about 700 years,21 and storm surge depth was in the 1,000-year return period
range.22 Very low probability disasters do occur; it is thus important to integrate these events
into the pricing mechanism. Since the NFIP was designed to be able to compensate the average
ﬂood event and could tap into the U.S. Treasury to borrow money in case a truly catastrophic
event happened, its pricing mechanism does not necessarily take into account the conse-
quences of such extreme events. Private insurers normally consider the entire spectrum of
events because they are responsible for paying all the legitimate claims covered in the policy.
The catastrophe model used in this paper determines house-based ﬂood exposure by including
ﬂood events ranging from an annual likelihood of 1 in 100 to extremely low probabilities that
include events whose annual probability of occurrence is as low as 1 in 10,000.
FEMA rates also vary depending on the elevation of the ﬁrst ﬂoor of the dwelling in
relation to the 100-year return ﬂood event; however, FEMA does not collect elevation
information for many of the insured houses. Since one speciﬁc ﬂood zone typically covers
a fairly large area, local topological differences are not taken into account when setting
FEMA premiums. Rates for other zones outside of the 100-year ﬂood plain, such as X zones,
are derived from a general national model rather than local ﬂood risk maps.
This overall pricing strategy thus leads to important divergences from the true risk for a
number of residents covered by the programme. Rates are not risk-based at the individual
level (probabilistically deﬁned), so prices might be (way) “too high” in some areas and (way)
“too low” in others, even if some of these properties were supposedly given a subsidy. The
U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) recognised this as a problem several years
ago6 but to date there has not been any quantiﬁcation of this divergence in the published
literature because, until recently, the data was maintained within FEMA and the technology
was not capable of pricing ﬂood risk at a granular level.
These discrepancies between NFIP’s pricing versus probabilistic risk estimates that
integrates the local characteristics of the property have had important consequences on
the ﬁnancial balance of the programme. Claims from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma
and other ﬂoods in 2005 pushed the operating budget of the programme into debt. Hurricane
Katrina alone generated US$16.1 billion in ﬂood insurance payments. Between 2005 and
2008 (due to claims from Hurricane Ike in Texas in 2008), the programme had to borrow a
total of US$19.3 billion from the U.S. Treasury.23 The NFIP had started to repay some of
these funds until it was hit by Sandy-related ﬂoods in 2012; it currently incurs a US$27
billion deﬁcit.
It will be very difﬁcult for the programme to repay this debt: total annual premiums for
the programme are about US$3.5 billion and annual interest payments alone have been as
21 Hall and Sobel (2013).
22 Aerts et al. (2014).
23 King (2012).
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high as US$900 million. In some sense, the debt accumulated after the 2005 and 2008 losses
just conﬁrmed what was known since the inception of the programme: it was designed to be
ﬁnancially self-supporting, or close to it, most of the time, but cannot handle extreme
ﬁnancial catastrophes by itself.24,25
Determination of ﬂood insurance pure premiums using catastrophe modelling
This section undertakes a detailed analysis of how much risk-based pure premiums should be
at the single-family residence level in two Texas counties when incorporating extreme ﬂood
events.
Focus on Texas
Texas is a natural candidate for this pilot study for several reasons. The state is exposed to
both storm surge-related ﬂooding and to riverine ﬂooding. It is the second most populous
state in the U.S. after California with over 24 million residents, approximately one-third of
them residing in a coastal county. Texas is one of the fastest growing states in the nation,
averaging 21 per cent population growth per decade since 1960 compared to an average 11.4
per cent population growth per decade for the entire United States over the same time period.
It has the second largest state gross domestic product (GDP) in the U.S. at over US$1.2
trillion dollars26). Today it has 12 per cent of the total NFIP policies in force.
An analysis of NFIP claims reveals that the majority of Hurricane Ike’s US$2.6 billion in
ﬂood insurance claims were ﬁled by policyholders in a number of Texas counties. We focus
the study on two speciﬁc counties, Travis (inland county; riverine ﬂood), which includes the
capital city of Austin, and Galveston (coastal county along the Gulf of Mexico; riverine and
storm surge ﬂood) (Figure 1). Together they total 1.3 million residents.27 These two counties
are among the top seven most ﬂooded counties of the total 254 in Texas over the period
1960–2009, with Galveston being ﬁfth and Travis seventh.28 Galveston is also the Texas
county most frequently hit by hurricanes and tropical storms over this time period.
Determination of risk-based pure premiums using catastrophe models
In order to determine the risk-based pure premiums that should be charged to cover the ﬂood
risk, estimates must be made of the frequency of speciﬁc events and the likely extent of
resulting losses. Traditional statistical techniques used by actuaries for estimating future
losses that rely on a wealth of available claims data, for example such as from automobile
accidents or house ﬁres. They are not appropriate for estimating future losses from natural
catastrophes because of the relatively low frequency of these events. A probabilistic
approach to catastrophe loss analysis, that is, catastrophe modelling, is the most appropriate
24 Wetmore et al. (2006).
25 Note that we have focused here on the insurance pillar of the NFIP; the programme also integrates several other
elements (e.g. risk mapping; Community Rating System; risk awareness campaigns).
26 U.S. Bureau of the Census (2011).
27 Texas State Data Center (2011).
28 SHELDUS (2011).
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way to handle these loss data challenges. The catastrophe model used for this analysis was
jointly provided by CoreLogic (one of the largest data providers in the United States) and the
reinsurance company Swiss Re.29
The proprietary nature of the model precludes us from revealing its details but we provide
its features below. Furthermore, while Corelogic is a commercial ﬁrm it is a primary source
of data for the U.S. federal government.30 The SwissRe ﬂood model has been used by a
number of clients around the world,31 including several public entities in the United States.
For instance, New York City used the Swiss Re model to assess its exposure and undertake
beneﬁt/cost analyses of several risk reduction measures in the aftermath of Hurricane
Sandy.1, 32 We feel the use of these models by public sector organisations provides
a level of assurance regarding its validity. More details on this point are provided in
Appendix B.
A probabilistic catastrophe modelling approach provides more value than a deterministic
approach because it includes all the expected events that can cause damage and it generates a
detailed analysis of return periods based on advanced hazard models. The four basic modules
of a catastrophe model are: hazard, inventory, vulnerability and loss.33
Figure 1. Focus of the study: Counties of Galveston (coastal) and Travis (inland), TX.
29 The ﬂood model originally built by Swiss Re is executed by CoreLogic with hazard, exposure and vulnerability
components jointly enhanced from each organisation building on each of their respective data strengths.
30 The CoreLogic database consists of over 3.3 billion property and ﬁnancial records spanning 40 years, and
contains more than 99 per cent of U.S. property records. Nineteen federal agencies rely on CoreLogic data for
their analyses.
31 www.media.swissre.com/documents/pitchbook_global_ﬂ_zones_ﬁnal.pdf (accessed 1 September 2014)
32 In Europe, a group of insurance companies has been working with the European Space Agency on a project to
improve ﬂood risk quantiﬁcation. The joint effort between satellite operators, Earth observation service
providers and the insurance industry will provide detailed ﬂood footprints based on satellite data.
33 For more information on catastrophe modelling, see Grossi and Kunreuther (2005) and Born and Martin (2006).
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance—Issues and Practice
8
The hazard module includes two main parts.34 The ﬁrst part addresses the occurrence and
frequency of the events. It does this by ﬁrst developing a stochastic event set, a set of
simulated events characterising the observed or scientiﬁcally modelled events and their
probabilities of occurrence. The second part of the hazard module calculates the severity of
the events at every site of the study region.
Flood hazards within the CoreLogic and Swiss Re models are comprised of both riverine
ﬂooding and hurricane-related storm-surge ﬂooding for coastal locations. The riverine ﬂood
inundation water depths from a collection of ﬂood events at a given property’s latitude and
longitude are computed through an empirical relationship determined by the probability of
ﬂood occurrence combined with the ﬂood intensity of the events. By specifying the set of
water depths across all ﬂooded properties, one can then determine the ﬁnancial loss impacts
of ﬂood events on a targeted geographical area. The CoreLogic and Swiss Re models
generated 400,000 simulated riverine ﬂood events in the United States; speciﬁc to our
analysis, approximately 2,000 of them impacted Galveston County and approximately 5,000
of them impacted Travis County (see Appendix B for more information).
The hurricane storm-surge ﬂood inundation water depths for a given coastal location are
computed through an empirical relationship determined by the storm surge heights
(associated with hurricanes of different intensities) at different landfall locations, combined
with the stochastic hurricane event set deﬁning storm surge location, frequency and intensity.
Thus, the resulting storm-surge ﬂood event is deﬁned as the set of varying water depths
across all ﬂooded properties within the predetermined coastal geographical area. The
probabilistic ﬂood event set generated in the storm surge module provides simulated data
for tropical cyclones over 10,000 years based upon statistical data for storms in the North
Atlantic and Gulf Coast regions over the past 150 years. Over 100,000 individual storm
tracks are represented and approximately 1,000 of them impacted Galveston County. A
coastal model was used to determine the geospatial distribution of storm surge heights
generated from the ﬁve different hurricane intensity categories striking the U.S. coast. The
storm surge module utilises maximum storm surge heights to simulate the resulting surge
impact area and corresponding water depths (see Appendix B for more information).
The second module of a catastrophe model characterises the inventory of the properties at
risk. This can be a building of speciﬁc interest, a dwelling representative of the average
construction type in a given area exposed to the hazard, or an entire portfolio of buildings
with different characteristics (e.g. an entire city).
Here we focused on single-family residences at risk from ﬂooding. Data on elevation
and ﬂood zone for 226,407 single-family residences were collected by CoreLogic and
input into the CoreLogic and Swiss Re ﬂood catastrophe model for Travis County. These
226,407 single-family residences represent 76 per cent of the 316,479 parcels collected
by CoreLogic for Travis County. (The next largest group of parcels in each county is
vacant property, which is land only and therefore would have no property exposed to
ﬂoods; see Appendix B for more detail on the inventory).
We then overlap the GIS-based information on residences with the FEMA ﬂood
insurance rate maps for these areas in Texas. Table 1 provides the total number of single-
family residences located in different FEMA ﬂood zones as well as the mean exposure
34 For more information about the ﬂood catastrophe model used here, see Czajkowski et al. (2013).
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values input into the model in each zone used for this analysis.35 In our data sample,
Travis County has over US$54 billion in exposure with 95 per cent of this exposure in the
designated low-risk X/C FEMA ﬂood zone, which is outside of the 100- and 500-year-return
ﬂood plains.
The third module quantiﬁes vulnerability, that is, how these properties at risk (inventory)
will behave physically under events that the hazard module has generated. Vulnerability
functions are the relationships between hazard intensity (e.g. water depth) and the level of
damage experienced. Vulnerability for each ﬂood hazard in the catastrophe model is the
average proportion of the property damaged (mean damage ratio) as a function of the
speciﬁed ﬂood depth determined by generating a large number of possible ﬂood scenarios.
The combination of exposure and vulnerability is obtained by gauging the ﬂood inundation
depth at each speciﬁc location due to riverine or storm-surge ﬂooding from any of the
probabilistic events. (Appendix B).
The fourth module is loss. It is determined by taking total value of damage given the
inventory exposure value and calculating the total loss based on engineering studies for
speciﬁc type of construction, elevation, location, etc. They can also be calibrated with
insurance claims data.
These losses are then compiled and collected in a table called an event loss table (ELT).
A typical ELT is such that each row corresponds to a catastrophe event taken from a group of
credible scenarios (e.g. ﬂood) with an identiﬁcation number (Event IDj), an annual rate of
occurrence (λj) and resulting loss (Lj) for IDj (Table 2).
Combining information on frequency and severity of losses, the probabilistic catastrophe
model generates the distribution of the expected losses associated with all possible scenarios
of disasters (here, ﬂoods). This is often expressed in terms of an aggregate loss exceedance
probability (EP) curve. For a given house or portfolio of structures at risk, an EP curve is a
graphical representation of the probability p that a certain level of aggregated loss $L will be
exceeded in a given year. The Average Annual Loss (AAL), which represents the expected
loss over all simulated events for an individual home in a given year, equals the area under
the EP curve.
Table 1 Travis County exposure value summary by FEMA ﬂood zone
FEMA ﬂood zone Number of single-family
residences
% of total
residences
Total exposure
valuea
% of total
exposure value
Average
exposure value
A 6,790 3 $1,536,512,177 3 $226,290
X500/B 5,010 2 $1,125,747,322 2 $224,700
X/C 214,607 95 $51,806,029,170 95 $241,400
Total county 226,407 100 $54,468,288,669 100 $240,577
aExposure value=Building value + 40 per cent contents.
35 The total insured value of these single-family residences input into the model was the collected building value
with a conservatively assigned content assumption of 40 per cent of the building value which is aligned with
Swiss Re client data content percentages. Building value was provided by CoreLogic as the market
improvement value, where market improvement value equals the residence’s total market value net of the
market land value with all market values as provided by the county or local taxing/assessment authority.
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To account for the impact of the exposure value on the derived AAL, the ratio of AAL over
quantity of exposure per US$1,000 is also determined. This is the pure premium.
The total loss from a single event is then the aggregate of losses in all sites of the study
region due to that event. With AAL values of individual residences it is indeed possible to
sum such estimates for all single-family residences in a given county or in a given FEMA
ﬂood zone for that county.
Results for Travis County
Table 3 presents AAL results for Travis County from the analysis we just described, grouped
by FEMA ﬂood zone where the properties are located. The column labelled “peril” reveals
that all single-family residences in the A (high risk) and X500 (moderate risk) zones have
some level of ﬂood risk loss associated with them as an outcome of our catastrophe model.
Total AAL in the A and X500 zones is US$10.2 and US$2.3 million respectively.36
Although 77 per cent of the single-family residences in this low-risk X zone have no
riverine ﬂood risk associated with them, there are still nearly 50,000 single-family
residences with some ﬂood risk having a total AAL=US$3.9 million from their
associated total US$9.3 billion in exposure. This provides an example of a relatively
signiﬁcant amount of ﬂood risk associated with a FEMA-designated “minimal” ﬂood risk
zone from a catastrophe model perspective.
On average, total AAL per single-family residence is over three times higher in the
A zone (US$1,508) compared with the X500 zone (US$461), and over 18 times higher than
the 49,069 at-risk single-family residences in the X zone (US$81). Similarly, when
accounting for differences in the exposure value across zones, the US$5.51 mean AAL cost
per US$1,000 in the A zone is still approximately 3 and 18 times higher than the US$1.69
and US$0.31 mean AAL cost per US$1,000 for the X500 and X zones, respectively.37
Despite this decline in high to low risk when moving from A to X500 to X zones as
represented by the high to low mean total AAL and loss costs per US$1,000 respectively, the
Table 2 Example of an event loss table
Event ID Annual rate of occurrence Loss
1 λ1 L1
2 λ2 L2
⋯ ⋯ ⋯
k λk Lk
⋯ ⋯ ⋯
K λK LK
36 In Travis County, total AAL is comprised of only riverine ﬂood loss as Travis County is an inland county not
subject to storm surge losses. Total AAL in Galveston County is comprised of both riverine and storm surge
ﬂood losses.
37 Note that these values are the average across each individual single-family residence’s AAL exposure per
US$1,000 determined result. Consequently, taking the (Total AAL/Total Exposure) times 1,000 at the county or
ﬂood zone levels shown in Table 2 will not provide the same result. We ﬁnd that the median is US$3.44,
US$0.34 and US$0.08 for single-family residences in zones A, X500 and X/C, respectively (the skewness is
0.55, 2.24 and 8.35, respectively).
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range of AAL costs per US$1,000 across all three ﬂood zones is essentially the same,
ranging from US$0.06 per US$1,000 of exposure to US$14 per US$1,000 of exposure. This
would indicate that some residences that are considered high risk by FEMA (because they
are located in an A zone) might actually be low risk due to their speciﬁc location within
that zone and/or special characteristic of the house. On the other hand, some residences
located in a FEMA designated low-risk zone can actually be highly exposed to ﬂooding. In
fact, the highest AAL cost per US$1,000 of exposure is US$14.28 located in the Travis
County X zone, which is outside of the designated high and moderate risk FEMA ﬂood
zones. Thus, if one only considers the average ﬂood risk in a given FEMA zone, the
heterogeneity of risk across properties is not taken into account.
Our results for Travis County highlight the importance of undertaking a microanalysis of
the exposure of residents to riverine ﬂood and storm surge to determine the risk-based pure
premium associated with a given single-family residence. Similarly classiﬁed FEMA ﬂood
zones in different parts of the country can have signiﬁcantly different ﬂood risks and hence
different risk-based pure premiums. Thus, one cannot simply average the risk in a given
ﬂood zone to specify premiums. Using the results of this AAL analysis for Travis County as
well as a similar analysis for Galveston (below), we can compare premiums computed by the
catastrophe model with those currently charged by NFIP to residents in these two counties.
We now turn to this comparison.
Comparison of our catastrophe-model results with NFIP premiums
Unloaded premium comparison
Insurance premiums charged to consumers are comprised of risk-based AAL and other
loading factors such as administrative expenses, cost of capital, etc. In the previous
section we calculated the unloaded risk-based pure premium that is, the average annual
loss accounting for all possible events considered by the catastrophe model without any
loading cost. To compare this unloaded premium with a similar unloaded NFIP premium,
administrative expenses from the NFIP premium rates must be subtracted. Let λ be the
loading cost charged by the NFIP. Hence the NFIP premium for a residential structure is
(1+λ)AAL, where AAL was calculated by FEMA. In an analysis of the ﬁnancial operation
of the ﬁrst 40 years of the programme, Michel-Kerjan2 ﬁnds that the average value of
λNFIP is about 50 per cent. This pays for programme expenses such as fees to participating
insurers and agents selling ﬂood insurance policies and assessing claims on behalf of the
NFIP, operating costs of the programme and ﬂood risk mapping.
We accessed the entire portfolio of the programme for the two counties under study for the
year 2009 and generated the implicit AAL by subtracting this loading cost from the full
premiums charged by the NFIP to obtain the adjusted average loss cost.38 Table 4 presents the
results of our unloaded premium comparison for 226,407 single-family residences in Travis
38 The NFIP data set we accessed from FEMA provides us only with ZIP codes which we used to extract
associated NFIP single-family policy data for Travis County and Galveston County. We used 60 ZIP codes for
Travis County and 17 ZIP codes for Galveston County. We also conducted a series of robustness checks on this
matched ZIP code data with very similar results as to what is presented here.
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County from Table 3 and our generated unloaded NFIP premiums for 7,723 residences with
NFIP policies in that county.39 Note that because of low insurance penetration, the number of
NFIP policies in force is typically much lower than the number of single-family residences.
A key result shown in the Table 4 comparison is that the mean probabilistically based pure
premium, AAL (as an outcome of our catastrophe model) is sometimes higher and
sometimes lower than the comparable adjusted average premium currently charged by the
NFIP. For example, the average adjusted NFIP average loss cost for the X500 zone (areas of
moderate ﬂood hazard) is US$3.19 per US$1,000 of coverage, almost two times higher than
the US$1.69 per US$1,000 of exposure from our probabilistic model. In the X zone (areas of
minimal ﬂood hazard) the difference is much larger: US$1.13 vs US$0.07—on average the
NFIP overcharges by a factor of 16 in that zone.40
However, in the Travis County A zone (high-risk 100-year ﬂood zone) we see that the
model shows a mean pure premium of US$5.51 per US$1,000 of coverage, roughly 1.5
times larger than the comparable average adjusted NFIP premium of US$3.47.
In other words, in Travis County, on average, the NFIP overcharges insured residents in
low-risk areas and undercharges those in high-risk areas.41 But even in cases when the pure
premium would on average be higher than what is currently charged by FEMA (e.g. A zone
in Travis County; US$5.51 vs US$3.47; see Table 4), the result from the catastrophe model
analysis is not necessarily true for all residences, contrary to what one often hears about
the NFIP always undercharging high-risks, as illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts the
distribution of our two samples for different premium brackets.
In fact, 50 per cent of the 6,790 A zone residences’ unloaded premiums from our study fall
below the average NFIP A zone pure premium amount of US$3.47. Similarly, 84.1 per cent
of the 5,010 X500 zone policies from the model have an unloaded premium less than the
average X500 NFIP pure premium of US$3.19,42 and 99.2 per cent of the 214,607 X zone
policies from the model have an unloaded premium less than the average X zone NFIP pure
premium of US$1.13 (ﬁgures not reported in the tables).
Taken together, these ﬁndings show that conventional wisdom about the NFIP is incorrect.
Indeed, it has been said that the NFIP systematically overprices low risk and underprices
high risks.43 But we also ﬁnd that some high-risk properties are actually overpriced and some
low-risk properties are underpriced. Thus, there is likely to be a signiﬁcant opportunity for
the insurance industry to market insurance at lower rates than the NFIP, especially in low-
risk areas, if insurers are allowed to charge risk-based premiums.
Let us reiterate here several possible reasons for these ﬁndings. Many FEMA ﬂood maps
are outdated (due mainly to limited resources at their disposal). Advanced ﬂood mapping
technologies employed by private ﬁrms are able to address the existing FEMA ﬂood map
limitations. For instance, the overall extent of the ﬂood zones is expanded to outside the
39 We also conducted a similar analysis for the 188,496 single-family residences in Travis County with a building
value less than or equal to the NFIP building value coverage limit of US$250,000 (83 per cent of total single-
family residences analyzed). Average loss cost results per US$1,000 were very similar.
40 This X zone result also holds for the 49,069 single-family residences in the X zone that have some ﬂood
exposure: the average probabilistic pure premium in this case is US$0.31 as shown in Table 2.
41 Travis County’s location is such that there is no storm surge risk there; so no V zone.
42 Note here that this is based on only 48 policies; so results may not be representative.
43 King (2012); PCIAA (2011).
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FEMA 100-year and 500-year ﬂood zone boundaries through a ﬂood elevation variance-
based methodology and intrinsic characteristics of the riverine system. In addition, these
features are continuously revised through live ﬂood map updates and therefore, the hazard
module is also continuously revised with approximately 1,000 modiﬁcations per year
incorporated into the hazard module.
Furthermore, a catastrophe model probabilistic approach includes 200-year, 500-year,
1,000-year and greater ﬂood magnitudes, whereas FEMA rates do not include those very low
probability events in the tail of the distribution. In other words, FEMA truncates the tail of
the distribution, whereas a catastrophe model integrates the possibility of truly catastrophic
losses into the ﬂood assessment (e.g. events with a 500-year, 1,000-, 5,000-year return
period). Signiﬁcant ﬂood events are not limited to the 100-year ﬂoodplain and could affect
structures in FEMA-designated minimal ﬂood risk areas.
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Figure 2. Distribution of AAL vs NFIP unloaded pure premiums.
Table 4 Travis County unloaded premium comparison: Unloaded probabilistic ﬂood model and
unloaded NFIP pure premiums
FEMA
ﬂood zone
Travis County study AAL results NFIP unloaded premium data
Number of
single-family
residences
Mean total
AAL per
home
Mean AAL
cost per
US$1,000
Number of
single-family
residences
Adjusted (67%)
average NFIP
premium
Adjusted
average
loss cost per
US$1,000
A 6,790 $1,508 $5.51 3,726 $512 $3.47
X500/B 5,010 $461 $1.69 48 $462 $3.19
X/C 214,607 $18 $0.07 3,949 $239 $1.13
Travis County
total
226,407 $73 $0.27 7,723 $372 $2.30
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Also, while the NFIP calculates rates for a variety of ﬂoodplains within the high-risk A
and V zones, the ﬁnal elevation-based rates are set for each ﬂood zone for the nation as a
whole; rates for structures with the same elevation difference in similar ﬂood zones are the
same everywhere in the country. As such some residences that are considered high risk by
FEMA (because they are located in an A zone) might actually be low risks because of a
speciﬁc location within that zone and/or special characteristic of the property, such as its
elevation. Rates for other zones outside the high-risk areas, such as the moderate risk X500
and minimal risk X zones, are derived from the high-risk modelled rates rather than their own
distinct local ﬂood risk maps. This pricing strategy clearly leads to important cross-
subsidisations in the programme. Rates are not risk-based at the local level (probabilistically
deﬁned), so prices will be “too high” in some areas and “too low” in others, as our results in
Table 4 show.
We undertook a similar analysis (comparing the AAL derived from the catastrophe model
with the NFIP unloaded premiums) for all single-family residences located in Galveston
County, which is prone to both riverine ﬂood and storm surge (hence we introduce the
coastal high-risk V zone in our analysis). Table 5 presents the results of this comparison. For
Galveston, the model results are based upon 89,046 residences while there are 68,644
residences in the comparable NFIP data set for the 17 matched Galveston County ZIP codes.
This difference is greatest in the X500 zone with the 5,988 NFIP policies collected
representing 31.6 per cent of the single-family residences in Galveston County within the
X500 zone from our model. The large number of NFIP X zone policies in Galveston (93 per
cent of the 46,829 model policies) indicate that there is signiﬁcant risk in this X zone despite
its classiﬁcation of minimal risk.
The unloaded premiums across ﬂood zones is not systematically higher than the
comparable average premium being charged by the NFIP. The results in Table 5 show that
on average the NFIP undercharges residents in A zone in Galveston County (US$3.43 vs
US$6.61 according to the catastrophe model) as it does for those in A zone in Travis County
(US$3.47 versus US$5.51).44 We ﬁnd that 12.1 per cent of the 17,940 A zone policies from
the model have an unloaded premium less than the average NFIP A zone pure premium of
US$3.43. However, while it on average overcharges residents in moderate and minimal risk
zones (X500 and X) in Travis County, on average it undercharges residents in similar ﬂood
zones in Galveston County (US$1.29 vs US$4.21 in X500 zones; US$0.96 vs US$1.64 in
X zones). Overall, 2.6 per cent of the 18,922 X500 zone model policies and 34.5 per cent of
the 46,829 X zone model policies are below the respective US$1.29 and US$0.96 NFIP
X500 and X zone average unloaded premiums. Again, we ﬁnd important elements of cross-
subsidisation within each of the risk categories where some high-risk properties are actually
over-priced and some low-risk properties are underpriced.
Turning to storm surge risk, the adjusted average NFIP pure premium for the Galveston
County V zone is US$9.49 per US$1,000 of coverage, compared with US$6.60 per
US$1,000 from our model.45 Indeed, 90.1 per cent of the 5,355 V zone unloaded premiums
44 Dixon et al. (2007) found a similar result for the lender-place market only—see Table 4.2, p. 32.
45 Storm surge ﬂood-related losses are the main driver behind the Table 4 probabilistic model unloaded premium
results comprising at least 89 per cent of the average AAL loss costs per US$1,000 values across all ﬂood zones
even for the areas outside the high-risk V and coastal A zones, or the areas not subject to storm-surge ﬂood risk
according to FEMA ﬂood zone classiﬁcations.
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from our study fall below the average NFIP unloaded premium amount of US$9.49. Clearly,
the conventional wisdom that the NFIP systematically underprices high-risk properties is
shown not to be true in these two counties.
On the other hand, many residences are not classiﬁed by FEMA as being in a V zone
even though they should be, as illustrated by Hurricane Ike in 2008, which was primarily a
storm-surge ﬂooding event. Our analysis of the NFIP portfolio reveals that there were
nearly 20,000 NFIP claims in Galveston County from Hurricane Ike, totalling US$1.3
billion in insured losses. But we ﬁnd that only approximately 3,000 (15 per cent) of
Galveston’s claims from Ike could have been from the Galveston County’s V zone given
the number of policies in force there. Consequently, it is likely that 85 per cent of the total
Ike claims were from policies that on average are being charged premiums less than the
risk-based premiums as shown in Table 5 for A, X500, and X zones (US$3.43 vs US$6.61,
US$1.29 vs US$4.21, and US$0.96 vs US$1.64, respectively). It is doubtful that under-
pricing 85 per cent of total policies is a viable long-term ﬁnancial position, even if another
15 per cent of policies are overpriced on average.
Full (loaded) premium comparison
The NFIP’s goals with respect to setting prices differ from those of a private insurance
company because the NFIP does not have to seek a proﬁt, nor must its prices reﬂect the cost
of capital that private insurers need to set aside to meet solvency requirement from regulators
and rating agencies. Paying federal/foreign income taxes and premium taxes is another
requirement that private insurers must bear. Here we are interested in comparing the full
premiums charged by the NFIP to what private insurers would have to charge given their
own constraints should they want to offer the same coverage to single-family residences
living in these two counties; that is the loaded premium.
In order to compare this full premium to the NFIP premiums, a private sector ﬁrm’s
loading factor must be added to the modelled pure premium values from Tables 4 and 5.
Table 5 Galveston County premium comparison: Unloaded probabilistic ﬂood model and unloaded
NFIP pure premiums
FEMA
ﬂood zone
Galveston County study AAL results NFIP unloaded premium data
Number of
single-family
residences
Mean total
AAL per
home
Mean AAL
cost per
US$1,000
Number of
single-family
residences
Adjusted (67%)
average NFIP
premium
Adjusted average
loss cost per
US$1,000
V 5,355 $1,776 $6.60 2,938 $2,224 $9.49
A 17,940 $969 $6.31 16,286 $534 $3.43
X500/B 18,922 $485 $4.21 5,988 $215 $1.29
X/C 46,829 $251 $1.64 43,432 $217 $0.96
Galveston
County total
89,046 $537 $3.43 68,644 $378 $1.94
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The premium charged will be (1+λprivate)AAL, where λprivate is the loading factor a private
insurer must charge on top of the pure premium.46
A recent paper by the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America47 provides some
estimates of what some insurers might charge for such a loading. In addition to the cost
of administering the insurance policy and settling claims (for which one can estimate a
50 per cent loading cost similar to what insurers currently charge the NFIP for their services),
another 23 per cent must be added to reﬂect taxes (8 per cent) and the cost of capital
(15 per cent). In other words, a 73 per cent loading cost (λprivate=0.73) would be required if
private insurers were to offer ﬂood insurance.47 If the insurer were to offer coverage only in
high-risk zones, this cost of capital could be much higher, bringing the total loading factor to
100 or 200 per cent (λprivate=1 or 2). We thus examine scenarios with different loading
factors, λprivate=0.5, 1, 2 and 3. Table 6 presents the results of our premium comparison for
Travis County with NFIP premiums having λNFIP=0.50 and private insurance using the
average loss cost per US$1,000 model results with the different loading factors just noted.
Table 6 reveals that a loading factor of nearly 200 per cent must be applied for the
premiums charged by insurers in the X500 zone to be greater than the loaded NFIP values on
average. This implies a tripling of the unloaded pure premium. In the X/C zone, even
applying a loading factor of up to 300 per cent we see that the loaded pure premium values
are still signiﬁcantly lower than the NFIP premiums on average. Overall, one sees that it
would take a large loading factor for the private sector to charge more than the average
US$3.39 per US$1,000 coverage currently charged by the NFIP on average for Travis
County residents in these zones.
Table 7 presents the results of our full premium comparison for Galveston County using
a similar methodology. Here the results are somewhat different, though. In V zones, insurers
Table 6 Travis County full premium comparison: NFIP and probabilistic ﬂood model with various
loading factors
FEMA
ﬂood zone
NFIP Study AAL results with different loading factors
Average premium loss
cost per US$1,000
Unloaded mean AAL
cost per US$1,000
λ=0.5 λ=1 λ=2 λ=3
A $5.18 $5.51 $8.26 $11.02 $16.53 $22.03
X500/B $4.76 $1.69 $2.54 $3.38 $5.07 $6.76
X/C $1.68 $0.07 $0.11 $0.14 $0.21 $0.28
Travis County total $3.39 $0.27 $0.40 $0.54 $0.81 $1.08
46 This loading will depend on the characteristics of each ﬁrm, its portfolio diversiﬁcation across geographies and
types of risks (e.g. an insurer covering hurricane risks in coastal states might diversify its portfolio by selling
ﬂood risk insurance in Minnesota), correlation of risks regions, and hazards it covers (e.g. ﬂood vs surge),
whether there is some possible exposure to extreme events, whether it purchases some reinsurance and if so at
what price, taxes it has to pay, administrative costs, etc. Note also that insurance regulators might not allow
insurers to charge this premium because of pressure to keep premiums artiﬁcially low to please consumers.
47 PCIAA (2011).
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could impose a 100 per cent loading on top of the pure premiums and still charge less
(US$13.19 per US$1,000 of coverage) than what the NFIP is currently charging (US$14.17)
on average. In the other zones, insurers would always charge more than the current average
NFIP premium. In the A zone, we do ﬁnd that the NFIP prices would remain on average
much cheaper relative to what a private insurer would charge with virtually any loading
factor. From this analysis it appears clearly that NFIP is largely overpricing properties in V
zones and underpricing those that are located in less ﬂood-exposed areas of Galveston on
average.
Discussion and conclusion
Summary of the research
Beneﬁting from access to the NFIP portfolio and modern catastrophe ﬂood models, this
paper provides the ﬁrst systematic analysis of the potential for private ﬂood insurance in the
United States to complement the current NFIP operation. We are indeed able to price ﬂood
insurance for individual single-family residences using these new modelling techniques.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that in some areas, many homeowners are on average currently
charged much higher premiums by this federal programme than what could be offered by a
representative private insurer. In other ﬂood-prone areas it would be hard for that private
insurer to compete because the NFIP charges much less than the expected loss, or has a lower
loading factor than that required for the insurer to be compensated for administrative and
marketing expenses and cost of capital.
Taken together, these results offer several important insights into the debate on reforming
ﬂood insurance in the United States and in other countries (e.g. the United Kingdom). First,
undertaking a microanalysis of the true exposure of residents to riverine and storm surge
risks is important to determine the true risk-based pure premiums. One cannot simply
aggregate risks per ﬂood zones, as there is considerable heterogeneity in a given ﬂood zone.
It is important to determine the pure premium associated with a speciﬁc property in a given
area that represents the risk associated with ﬂooding, including the risk for truly catastrophic
Table 7 Galveston County full loaded premium comparison: NFIP and probabilistic ﬂood model with
various loading factors
FEMA
ﬂood zone
NFIP Study AAL results with different loading factors
Average premium loss
cost per US$1,000
Unloaded mean AAL
cost per US$1,000
λ=0.5 λ=1 λ=2 λ=3
V $14.17 $6.60 $9.89 $13.19 $19.79 $26.38
A $5.12 $6.31 $9.47 $12.63 $18.94 $25.26
X500/B $1.92 $4.21 $6.32 $8.42 $12.64 $16.85
X/C $1.44 $1.64 $2.46 $3.28 $4.92 $6.56
Galveston County total $2.90 $3.43 $5.14 $6.85 $10.28 $13.71
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events. Our analysis should also provide important insight into the implementation of recent
legislation in the United States: The Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 and the
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 both direct the NFIP to move to
more risk-based premiums over time.
Could a large private ﬂood insurance market emerge in the U.S.?
Our work demonstrates that the technology exists today to more accurately price ﬂood risk.
The deﬁcit the NFIP now faces (US$27 billion) has triggered an interest in the United States
about (partial) privatisation of residential ﬂood insurance. As mentioned earlier, some
private ﬂood insurance is sold, but this is a very small portion of the overall market. Whether
there will be a signiﬁcant shift towards much more private ﬂood insurance being sold in the
U.S. in the coming years remains to be seen. Of course, the decision by primary insurers to
sell ﬂood insurance at a given price depends on other factors that have not been analysed in
this paper. These include but are not limited to: the ability of insurers to charge rates
reﬂecting risk predicated on probabilistic modelling in a highly regulated market, special
treatment to be given to those who cannot afford risk-based premiums, a strategy for
transitioning existing NFIP policies into the private market, the management of high-risk
repetitive loss locations, data sharing and accurate mapping. One also has to consider the
possible correlation or diversiﬁcation of ﬂood risk with wind exposure from hurricanes or
other risks in an insurer’s portfolio.
Addressing these issues forms the basis for future research on how private insurers could
be more active in providing ﬂood coverage as a complement to the NFIP. For example, an
analysis could be undertaken to better understand the appetite of primary insurers to
participate in a private ﬂood insurance market and what they believe are the major
impediments in this regard. Some private insurers seem to have solved some of these issues
and have begun to compete with the NFIP. For instance, Private Flood Insurance, a private
insurer backed by Lloyd’s now offers residential ﬂood insurance in 16 states, most of them
coastal, where the ﬂood risk is typically high. On its website, the company advertises its
product as “a simple alternative to FEMA ﬂood insurance. While less expensive, our policies
cover just as much as a FEMA National Flood Insurance Policy.”
Privatisation of ﬂood insurance could also be introduced by having the NFIP purchase
partial reinsurance from private reinsurers or by issuing a catastrophe bond to cover
unusually large ﬂood losses such as those experienced from Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy.48
In Florida some exposure to severe wind damage from hurricanes has been transferred from
the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (the state reinsurer) to international insurance and
reinsurance markets. For instance, the FHCF issued a US$2 billion bond in 2013 that would
help it pay claims in the event of a major hurricane.49 Similar actions have been taken by the
California Earthquake Authority for large-scale seismically related losses.50
48 Michel-Kerjan (2010); Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther (2011); GAO (2014).
49 More details on the bond structure are available on the FHCF’s website at: www.sbaﬂa.com/fhcf/LinkClick
.aspx?ﬁleticket=PpfxTWgmo9w%3d&tabid=316&mid=998
50 www.earthquakeauthority.com/UserFiles/File/Release/CEA%20Second%20Transformer%20Deal%20Release
%20FINAL.pdf
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While more private ﬂood (re)insurance would help increase the number of residents with
ﬁnancial protection when the next large ﬂood occurs, the government will still have an
important role to play as reinsurer of last resort and providing technical and ﬁnancial support
for enforcing ﬂood risk management regulations as discussed in a recent U.S. Government
Accountability report on “Strategies for Increasing Private Sector Involvement).51
Demand side considerations
One open question is how these emerging dynamics on the supply side will impact the
demand for ﬂood insurance. A New York Times analysis published a few days after
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 revealed that six out of ten homeowners in New Orleans had no
ﬂood insurance.52 As pointed out in Mayor Bloomberg’s report following Hurricane Sandy
in 2012, “New York City estimates that less than 20 per cent of residential buildings in areas
inundated by Sandy had coverage through the NFIP” (Chapter 5, p. 97).1,53
This is conﬁrmed by the academic literature on ﬂood insurance. There is evidence that the
demand for ﬂood insurance is fairly price elastic. Prior studies show price elasticity of
demand for residential ﬂood insurance to be in the range of−0.62 to−0.8754 to−0.99,55 and as
high as −1.55 to −4.48 for ﬂood insurance policyholders who beneﬁt from subsidised rates
by the federal government.56
It is not clear how large the demand for residential ﬂood insurance will be in the coming
years. A series of detailed analysis could be conducted that would complement earlier
work in this arena,57 assessing household perceptions of ﬂood risk under situations where
premiums reﬂect risks, and monetary analysis of willingness to pay.58
Moreover, an in-depth analysis of the entire portfolio of the NFIP over the period 2000–
2009 reveals that the median tenure of ﬂood insurance is between two and four years implying
that many homeowners purchase coverage when they buy their property but let the insurance
lapse after a few years.59 This behaviour occurs even when homeowners are required to
purchase ﬂood insurance as a condition for a federally insured mortgage. Some banks and
ﬁnancial institutions have not enforced this regulation for at least two reasons: few of them
have been ﬁned and/or the mortgages are transferred to ﬁnancial institutions on the secondary
market in non-ﬂood-prone regions of the country that have not focused on either the ﬂood
hazard risk or the requirement that homeowners may have to purchase this coverage.
In this regard, it is worth considering whether ﬂood insurance should be required for
everyone residing in a ﬂood-prone area (as it is in France for instance), and if so, how to
51 GAO (2014).
52 Bayot (2005).
53 The numbers are believed to have been even lower for business; approximately 26,400 businesses with fewer
than 50 employees were in the Sandy inundation zone in New York, but only 1,400 commercial NFIP policies
were in effect when Sandy hit—95 per cent of them had no ﬂood insurance.
54 Landry and Jahan-Parvar (2011).
55 Browne and Hoyt (2000).
56 Landry and Jahan-Parvar (2011).
57 Browne and Hoyt (2000); Kriesel and Landry (2004); Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010); Kousky (2011);
Landry and Jahan-Parvar (2011).
58 Botzen and van den Bergh (2012).
59 Michel-Kerjan et al. (2012).
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enforce this requirement. One way to do this would be to tie ﬂood insurance to the property
rather than the individual, and entrust local communities to levy ﬂood insurance premiums
through real estate taxes.
Multi-year insurance contracts have been recently proposed as a complement or alter-
native to the standard one-year contract to ensure that homeowners retain their coverage.60
The design of such contracts must include a way to revise premiums that reﬂect risk
due to short-term events (e.g. a major catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina revealing
unanticipated risks of storm surge damage) or longer term changes (e.g. higher losses
due to sea level rise caused by climate change). A related issue is how to address the
affordability concerns that could emerge as a result of charging everyone risk-based
premiums. One possible approach is for FEMA to provide insurance vouchers to low-
income homeowners whose premiums increase due to the implementation of premiums
reﬂecting risk.61
In closing, let us indicate that other catastrophe modelling ﬁrms as well as some large
(re-)insurers are currently developing their own U.S. ﬂood models, and several are planning
to release these models in the near future. It would be instructive to compare the results of
similar analyses using these different catastrophe models to see where they diverge and
where they converge, and why. Having several ﬂood models available on the market could
also create competition that may lower the cost of using these. That would allow many more
insurers, local, state and federal government agencies to use them, since they will be more
easily affordable.62
This study has modelled riverine and storm-surge ﬂood risk at the single-family
residence level in two counties in Texas. It would be useful to expand this analysis to
more states and countries facing potential ﬂood damage. Given the restricted level of
geographic detail associated with available NFIP data (no information on addresses is
provided due to privacy concerns), it is not possible for us to do a residence-by-residence
model comparison of ﬂood insurance risk and pure premiums, including whether an
existing policy is subsidised or not. A more detailed NFIP pure premium comparison of
this nature would be useful to undertake. Finally, as noted in the introduction, several
countries have developed private ﬂood insurance markets. There are also studies under
way in the Netherlands on the feasibility of a ﬂood insurance market.63 It would be
important to determine the lessons that can be learned from other countries that could be
applied in modifying ﬂood insurance in the United States.
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Appendix A
Deﬁnitions of FEMA ﬂood zone designations
Flood zones are geographic areas that the FEMA has deﬁned according to varying levels
of ﬂood risk. These zones are depicted on a community's Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM)
or Flood Hazard Boundary Map. Each zone reﬂects the severity or type of ﬂooding in the
area.
Moderate- to low-risk areas
In communities that participate in the NFIP, ﬂood insurance is available to all property
owners and renters in these zones:
Zone Description
B and X Area of moderate ﬂood hazard, usually the area between the limits of the 100-
year and 500-year ﬂoods. Are also used to designate base ﬂoodplains of lesser
hazards, such as areas protected by levees from 100-year ﬂood, or shallow
ﬂooding areas with average depths of less than one foot or drainage areas less
than 1 square mile.
C and X Area of minimal ﬂood hazard, usually depicted on FIRMs as above the 500-
year ﬂood level.
High-risk areas
In communities that participate in the NFIP, mandatory ﬂood insurance purchase require-
ments apply to all these zones:
Zone Description
A Areas with a 1 per cent annual chance of ﬂooding and a 26 per cent chance of ﬂooding
over the life of a 30-year mortgage. Because detailed analyses are not performed for
such areas; no depths or base ﬂood elevations are shown within these zones.
AE The base ﬂoodplain where base ﬂood elevations are provided. AE zones are now
used on new format FIRMs instead of A1-A30 zones.
A1-30 These are known as numbered A zones (e.g, A7 or A14). This is the base ﬂoodplain
where the FIRM shows a base ﬂood elevation (old format).
AH Areas with a 1 per cent annual chance of shallow ﬂooding, usually in the form of a
pond, with an average depth ranging from 1 to 3 feet. These areas have a 26 per cent
chance of ﬂooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. Base ﬂood elevations
derived from detailed analyses are shown at selected intervals within these zones.
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(continued )
Zone Description
AO River or stream ﬂood hazard areas, and areas with a 1 per cent or greater chance of
shallow ﬂooding each year, usually in the form of sheet ﬂow, with an average depth
ranging from 1 to 3 feet. These areas have a 26 per cent chance of ﬂooding over the
life of a 30-year mortgage. Average ﬂood depths derived from detailed analyses are
shown within these zones.
AR Areas with a temporarily increased ﬂood risk due to the building or restoration of a
ﬂood control system (such as a levee or a dam). Mandatory ﬂood insurance
purchase requirements will apply, but rates will not exceed the rates for unnumbered
A zones if the structure is built or restored in compliance with AR zone ﬂoodplain
management regulations.
A99 Areas with a 1 per cent annual chance of ﬂooding that will be protected by a federal
ﬂood control system where construction has reached speciﬁed legal requirements.
No depths or base ﬂood elevations are shown within these zones.
High-risk—coastal areas
In communities that participate in the NFIP, mandatory ﬂood insurance purchase require-
ments apply to all these zones:
Zone Description
V Coastal areas with a 1 per cent or greater chance of ﬂooding and an additional
hazard associated with storm waves. These areas have a 26 per cent chance of
ﬂooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. No base ﬂood elevations are
shown within these zones.
VE, V1-30 Coastal areas with a 1 per cent or greater chance of ﬂooding and an additional
hazard associated with storm waves. These areas have a 26 per cent chance of
ﬂooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. Base ﬂood elevations derived
from detailed analyses are shown at selected intervals within these zones.
Appendix B
Additional information on the catastrophe model
Riverine ﬂood hazard determination
The ﬂood frequency map quantiﬁes the probability of any given location being ﬂooded, and
is constructed via three inputs—FEMA national ﬂood risk zone maps, United States
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Geological Survey (USGS) National Hydro data set, and the USGS National Elevation data
set. Flooding probabilities are deﬁned for each 90×90 meter (m) area over the entire United
States. Therefore, for any given property’s latitude and longitude, the model will locate the
associated 90×90 m area and retrieve the assigned probability value.
The event return period is based upon 43 years’ worth of monthly maximum
discharge measurements from over 4,100 gauging stations located throughout the United
States. To get the best possible capture of historical discharges, this data set was extended to
outlets of each of the 24,000 drainage basins the U.S. counts, using a routing methodology
that uses river networks, drainage area and precipitation as input parameters.
Then, Monte Carlo simulations were implemented to create an expanded probabilistic
event return period set to extend the 43-year historical event return period set. These return
period events have the same spatial and temporal correlations as the original ones, but unlike
the original data, cover a time span of 10,000 years. Return periods of events are deﬁned at a
ZIP code resolution. Figures B1 and B2 illustrate the event return period distribution for
Galveston and Travis Counties used in our model.
At a given property’s latitude and longitude, the riverine ﬂood inundation water depths
from a collection of ﬂood events are computed through an empirical relationship determined
by the probability of ﬂood occurrence combined with the ﬂood intensity (event return
period). Thus, the impact of ﬂood events on a targeted geographical area (such as a county)
can be quantitatively measured by the set of varying water depths across all ﬂooded
locations. For this study, the South Central USA geographical entity was used with 100,000
probabilistic events, with each event assigned an occurrence probability of 0.0001. With the
probability of ﬂood occurrence in the ZIP code area and ﬂood intensities (event return
period) from the ﬂood events that would have impact on the area, the ﬂood depths can be
determined through the empirical relationship.
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Figure B1. Galveston County riverine event distribution.
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Storm surge module
Given this generated storm surge intensity from the stochastic event set, the storm surge
height at a speciﬁc geographic location can be determined. Table B1 illustrates the
distribution of the various hurricane categories for Galveston County generated in the model.
Inventory module
Table B2 summarises the type and property account we consider in the catastrophe model for
Galveston County.
Vulnerability module
Vulnerability for ﬂood hazards in the CoreLogic and Swiss Re models represents the
relationship of water depth and mean damage ratio (MDR) on standardised categories of
residential properties. Figure B3 illustrates normalised mean damage degrees per various
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Table B1 Hurricane event set: Safﬁr-Simpson category summary for Galveston County (storm surge)
Safﬁr-Simpson hurricane
category
Number of events generated in our probabilistic approach
greater than or equal to category level
Cumulative %
5 108 11.1
4 196 20.2
3 304 31.4
2 470 48.5
1 969 100.0
Total 969
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water depths. Multiple sources of vulnerability data were used to generate the vulnerability
curves in the model. The main source of data for residential risks was the detailed NFIP loss
statistics compiled between 1978 and 2002, with over 850,000 single losses. To complete the
vulnerability set, engineering methods of damage assessment and expert opinion were used
as well.
About the Authors
Erwann Michel-Kerjan is the Executive Director of the Center for Risk Management and
Decision Processes at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and teaches in
Wharton MBA and executive programmes. Recipient of the prestigious Kulp-Wright award
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
n
o
rm
al
iz
ed
 m
ea
n 
da
m
ag
e 
de
gr
ee
0
1
0 100
water depths (cm)
200 300 400
Figure B3. Indicative riverine ﬂood vulnerability curve for mixed residential building.
Table B2 Summary of Galveston County total parcels by property types
Property code Property code deﬁnition Count
0 Miscellaneous 7
10 Single Family Residence/Townhouse 98,636
11 Condominium (residential) 143
20 Commercial 5,686
22 Apartment 1,875
50 Industrial 146
53 Transport 5
54 Utilities 302
70 Agricultural 2,415
80 Vacant 42,690
90 Exempt 4,751
NA NA 3,668
Total 160,324
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